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ABSTRACT

Since the 1980s the healthcare organisations across Europe have been subjected to intense pressure to adopt new managerial regimes (Dent, 2003). It is frequently noted that the medical profession represents a major obstacle to such change and that new managed systems represent a “clear departure” from the collegial, self-regulating modes of organisation traditionally favoured by this group (Powell et al., 1999). However, there are problems with assuming that professionals in all contexts will automatically resist management reforms. 

In this paper our aim is to address this matter by focusing on a comparison of Denmark and UK. Specifically, we compare the ‘strategies’ adopted by medicine in the two countries and the factors that have influenced these. Following Moran (2000) we argue that a focus on the agency of professional groups is crucial for understanding comparative NPM and its impact. 

The paper will be in five sections. First, we discuss the concept of professional ‘strategies’, drawing on institutional theory and the sociology of professions. Both traditions point to the ‘entrepreneurial role’ that professions play in defending or extending their jurisdictions in response to external challenges (Macdonald, 1995). However, it is noted that professional ‘projects’ are unstable, involving competition between groups, and may take on different forms in different countries. Whereas in the UK professions have been relatively free to form their activities and features, in central and Nordic Europe they have been more prone to use state structures as the basis for professional closure (Siegrist, 1990).

Section two provides information on healthcare reforms in Denmark and the UK. Both countries have been identified as ‘command and control’ models of provision based on ‘solidaristic’ principles (Moran, 2000). Moreover, professional groups, including doctors, have been significantly incorporated into a bureaucratic and state regulated system of employment (Light, 1995). However, from the late 1970s limits on the growth of expenditure, in both countries, and the drawing on private sector management ideas have seriously challenged the status quo. 

Thirdly we focus is on how the medical professions responded to new managerialism and the strategies they adopted. Drawing on interviews with hospital doctors and directors of peak organisations, as well as secondary sources, radically different responses are noted. In the UK, the profession has been largely defensive and disengaged, while in Denmark there is a discernable tendency for doctors to seeks to colonise management. 

The fourth section explores a number of possible explanations for these divergent tendencies. It is argued that historical processes of professional-state formation are important in shaping orientations and the extent to which doctors have been willing to engage with management. In the UK one finds a far weaker sense of corporatism and more entrenched separation of professional from administrative concerns (Ackroyd, 1996). Also, whereas in the UK, the medical profession was pushed to the sidelines and treated as ‘part of the problem rather than the solution’, in Denmark there existed a more co-operative relationship. In the former a new cadre of general managers was established to drive through change, effectively closing off opportunities for medicine to take on this role. By contrast, in Denmark the focus has been on achieving reform through the existing structure of locally administrated, professionally driven hospitals. 

Finally, the wider theoretical implications are discussed. We argue that the paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First is to question the assumption that health professionals will necessarily respond to management reforms in same way in all national contexts. Second, we point to a broader understanding of the factors that shape the nature and impact of these reforms. The importance of national institutions, welfare regimes and political traditions in shaping change has already been acknowledged. But what has been given less emphasis and what we shall demonstrate in this paper is the agency of professions themselves in shaping the way management reforms are received and implemented in different national contexts

Dancing to different rhythms: Exploring the role of professional ‘strategies’ in healthcare management reform in Denmark and the UK

Since the early 1980s there has been a common emphasis in healthcare systems across the world on reforming management and administration (Dent, 2003). Central to this have been efforts to marketise services and extend management ‘control over input mix and level, outputs and scope of activities’ (McKee and Healy, 2002). Such change was pioneered in a ‘high NPM group’ of counties’, notably the UK (Hood, 1995: 99), but has subsequently spread more widely. Indeed, it has been suggested that the movement to reform management has become ‘international fashion’ (Ham, 1997) with current trends indicating a pattern of isomorphism or convergence between national systems.

Notwithstanding these views, wide variations have been noted in the timing, pace and outcomes of restructuring. Attention has focused on the importance of welfare regime characteristics and political traditions that shape reform and lead to “distinctive national or regional variants” (Dent, 2006: 624). However, surprisingly, far less has been said about the role of clinical professionals in this process. In part this follows from a tendency to assume a ‘universality of the division between clinical and managerial perspectives’ (Degeling et al., 2006). Regardless of national context, it is believed that the natural response of clinicians will be to seek to resist or stifle change. This in turn may reinforce the assumption that professional agency, while important, is not a significant factor in seeking to account for variations in management reform between states. 

More recently this assumption has been challenged. Indeed, there is now a growing body of evidence that suggests that clinical professions have reacted to pressures for management in a variety of ways (Fitzgerald and Dufor, 1998). Dent (2003) notes how in some contexts, such as the Netherlands, where doctors have traditionally operated according to a ‘fee for service’ model, there has been less opposition to the marketisation of health services. Other studies have focused more on the value dimension of relationships between medicine and management. Comparing survey data from the United States and the United Kingdom Rundell et al. (2004) report divergences in opinion, with doctors in the latter being far more likely to believe that hospital management is driven by financial rather than clinical priorities. Degeling et al. (2006) reach similar conclusions focusing on Australia. England, New Zealand and China. Whereas in the commonwealth countries a scenario of ‘oppositional stalemate’ prevailed, in China doctors were far less defensive about threats to clinical autonomy and more willing to accommodate demands for technical efficiency and cost control. Finally there is a research pointing to variations, along national lines in the extent to which doctors have acquired new management competencies. In an important recent study Kurunmaki (2004: 336) reports that in Finland, unlike the UK, medicine has become ‘hybridised’ as a result of doctors embracing the techniques of accounting. In this context, she suggests, medicine is no longer exclusively curative in its aspirations, but has embraced ‘calculative expertise’ as a ‘legitimate competency’ as well. Hence, one finds a growing body of evidence to suggest ‘alternative change pathways’ (Jacobs, 2005: 158) between national systems characterised by marked variations in the way doctors, in particular, have engaged with management. 

In this paper our aim is to extend and further develop this line of comparative analysis, drawing on the notion of professional ‘strategies’. A key idea is that professions represent ‘collective organisations’ (Brint, 1994) in pursuit of social and occupational mobility to secure economic advantage and status. This process, we argue, may lead professionals to resist management or, alternatively to engage with it and possibly seek to capture the jurisdiction itself. Applying this to health settings we show how different national conditions, histories and trajectories of reform may be associated with radically different strategies and outcomes. 

What follows contains four main parts. First we define what we mean by professional ‘strategies’, drawing on ideas from mainstream institutional theory and the sociology of professions. Part two of the paper will then apply these ideas focusing on the illustrative case of healthcare management reforms in two north European States: the UK and Denmark. Drawing on a range of secondary sources we show how, despite broad similarities in institutions and reform goals clinical professions reacted to change quite differently in these two counties resulting in distinct reform pathways. In section three of the paper we explore a variety of explanations for these divergent professional responses. Finally, some of the wider theoretical implications of the findings are discussed. 

1.	Theoretical discussion

Professional strategies
A key point of departure for this paper is that it is appropriate and useful to talk about occupational groups (such as doctors or other clinical professions) as collective agents in pursuit of ‘strategies’ that unfold over time. The analysis draws heavily on the mainstream sociology of professions literature (MacDonald, 1995) as well as critical realist understandings of ‘corporate agency’ (Archer, 1995). These perspectives lead one to conceptualise professions as organised groups capable of articulating their interests and able to engage in concerted action to either maintain the status quo or re-model structures. Ultimately the goal is one of controlling the environment to ensure not just material rewards, but social status, power and autonomy as well. 

The essence of a ‘professional project’ is the attempt to appropriate public power to allow occupations to control entry to and competition within labour markets, while at the same time allowing them some degree of ‘institutional autonomy’ to regulate their own affairs. Central to this is the ability to monopolise given jurisdictions of work, creating and defining core knowledge (usually in conjunction with universities) while also managing access to training, accreditation and labour market opportunity. Success in this endeavour may depend much on the characteristics of abstract knowledge and its perceived utility. Also important are wider legitimacy claims of professions and the extent to which they have been able to forge a ‘coherent ideology’ to justify their special privileges both on the grounds of technical competency and social trusteeship (Brint, 1994). More generally, professional control emerges as the result of a delicate bargaining process enacted in a broader social and economic order (MacDonald, 1995). Crucial here are the interactions over time, between aspiring professions and other key actors in their field. In particular, their success in negotiating a ‘regulative bargain’ with the state will determine how far groups are able to control and close off access to knowledge and labour market opportunities. 

As noted, key outcomes of successful projects are improvements in the social and economic status of professions (Larson, 1977). Success however will also have implications for professional power, autonomy and influence within organisations (Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, 2003). Implied here is a form of ‘double closure’ whereby professions seek to combine ‘closure in the labour market outside employing organisations…’ with ‘control inside employing organisations’ (Ackroyd, 1996: 600). In some instances, this may amount only to a kind of de facto power over the means of service provision. In others, especially where professions own their organisations (as in the case of law and accounting firms), dominance could extend to the ability to shape strategic priorities, financial decisions and internal divisions of labour with subordinate occupations. Either way, one can see how professional projects have implications not just for the power and influence of occupations within labour market and policy arenas, but within employing organisations as well. 

A core assertion made in this paper therefore is that one can understand professions are collective agents engaged in ‘strategies’ that unfold over time. The thrust of these actions may be entirely defensive or conservative, seeking to protect jurisdictions and special privileges associated with guild power (Krause, 1996). Equally possible however is that professional strategies are expansionary in focus as groups seek to respond to threats and new opportunities in their environment. Indeed the very nature of a professional project implies change and collective mobility over time, especially in the modern era (Brint, 1994). Shifts in technology, state regulation and client demand invariably result in the destruction of certain work tasks and the creation of others. This in turn may lead established occupations seeking to redefine their core work to capture new jurisdictions or to ward off competition from other established or aspirant professions (Abbott, 1988).

This approach, of course, is not without certain difficulties and a number of caveats should be borne in mind. First, when using the term ‘strategy’ we are not implying that collective action is necessarily pre-planned or that goals are always known in advance. Rather, our approach is to suggest that ‘strategies’ are best understood as an emergent phenomenon, the result of interaction between a variety of contingent factors and conditions. Nor are the outcomes of strategy always intended. As Archer (1995: 260) suggests, corporate agents may succeed in changing their world but ‘usually not in the way any particular agent wants’. 

Second, the notion of collective ‘strategy’ should not be taken to imply a perfect symmetry of interests and outlooks within a given occupation over time. Most professions are segmented horizontally and vertically as well as in terms of class, gender and regional identity. Medicine in the UK is a classic example of this with the peak professional association (the BMA) acting more like a ‘federation’ of occupational associations, split into a series of ‘craft committees’ for consultants, junior doctors and general practitioners (Burrage, 1992). There are also indications that recent pressure to develop management capabilities within professional service organisations are leading to new points of fracture and division. As we will see, this may be especially true in health organisations where a growing number of studies report increasing polarisation between hybrid medical managers and rank and file doctors (for recent examples see Jacobs, 2005; Fitzgerald et al., 2006). Such findings however, do not negate the idea of collective projects or the existence of shared interests and identities. Rather they point to the need to recognise how the rewards of collective action are often unevenly distributed and that in some instances ‘collective solidarity’ may well give way to what Hoff (1999: 324) describes as ‘fragmented solidarity’. 

Finally and especially important given the aims of this paper is the need to qualify what is meant by the notion of professional ‘strategy’ in a comparative perspective. It is often noted that much of what passes for the sociology of professions is a heavily ‘Anglo-American field’ (Krause, 1996: 13) grounded in particular cultural assumptions. This has led some to question the very idea of professions as autonomous agents pursuing their interests independently of the state and a powerful university section. Such claims, it is argued, may be deeply rooted in the UK or US historical experience and have less relevance to professions on the continent (Torstendahl, 1990).  Indeed, it is suggested that the very notion of ‘strategies’ or projects makes little sense in countries where moves to develop professional credentials and status have been ‘top down’, largely at the behest of governments (Neal and Morgan, 2000). 

Against this is the view that in any ‘modern environment’ characterised by an open market for expertise there is always the opportunity for professions to emerge and pursue their collective interests (MacDonald, 1995). With some exceptions, even the most powerful states do not entirely ‘remove the features of market society that permit occupational groups to pursue their project’ (ibid, 98). As such it would be a mistake to reject the notion of professional strategies in comparative research. Rather the task is to explore how these strategies unfold in different historical and institutional contexts. While there are situations where the independent action of professions has been ‘seriously circumscribed’ (France or the ex-communist states being prime examples) ‘these constitute one end of a range of freedom of action rather than an invalidation of the concept of a professional project’ (Macdonald, 1995: 66). 

Professional strategies and management
The notion of ‘strategy’, we argue, has considerable value for understanding how professions might respond to management restructuring within organisations. With the exception of sole practitioners and very small partnerships, all professions have some kind of relationship with large organizations and are, to a greater or lesser extent, subject to bureaucratic oversight. This is most pronounced in the case of public service or ‘state mediated’ professions (such as nurses or teachers) but also applies to private sector groups including accountants or engineers (Johnson, 1972). However, while these tendencies are nothing new they do seem to be intensifying. According to Hinings (2005: 414) across all kinds of professional organization the trend is towards ‘more corporate and managerial modes of operation in search of increased efficiency’. Such change represents a “clear departure” (Powell et al., 1999) from older, more collegial modes of self-regulation, suggesting alternative goals (a paramount focus on efficiency) and a need to focus on management – and the co-ordination of services - as a discreet task or activity. 

Earlier we noted how, in much of the literature, it is assumed that professions – almost by definition - seek to resist or distance themselves from this kind of change. However, exploring this matter through the lens of occupational strategies might lead one to draw quite different conclusions. As we have seen this approach suggests that professional responses will be contingent rather than fixed. At one end of the spectrum professional associations and other peak organizations may lobby strongly against change. There may well be general indifference with regard to demands for reform of training and curriculum design. At micro level, within organizations practitioners may also refuse to engage in management work or actively seek to undermine decisions through a variety of oppositional tactics. Even when senior professionals reluctantly take on administrative roles their approach could be predominantly ‘custodial’, ‘wedded to the conceptions of practice held by service providers themselves’ (Ackroyd et al., 1989: 613).

These reactions, however, are by no means inevitable. The notion of strategy suggests that professions might act defensively or in a more acquisitive or expansionary fashion. It is possible therefore that under some conditions, a given profession might become more involved in management and even seek to assert control over it. The latter implies a kind of collective mobility project whereby a profession as a whole lays claim to the jurisdiction of management. Following Abbott (1988: 102) this would mean some attempt by occupations to ‘expand their cognitive dominion by using abstract knowledge to annex new areas, to define them as their own proper work’. A different, kind of response would be less coordinated attempts by professions to learn the techniques and discourses of management (for example accounting expertise). Kurunmaki, (2004: 336) refers to this as ‘hybridisation’, a process that depends on ‘the transferability of a particular set of tools rather than a competitive and jurisdictional battle underpinned by abstract knowledge claims’. Here a profession may acquire, over time, ‘diffuse legitimacy’ over the domain of management simply by monopolising actual task performance (Brint, 1994). 

Both of these scenarios indicate ways in which professions might engage in ‘internal restructuring’ – changing roles, education and career expectations - in order to maintain and extend professional dominance in the longer term (Friedson, 1994). In the context of medicine this could mean ‘redefining autonomy in order to preserve it’ (Edwards, 2003), or viewing management as an opportunity to extend clinical interests and improve services (Llewellyn, 2001). Of course, these processes may not necessarily involve all professionals or lead to the benefits being distributed equally. In some contexts the shift to management by senior echelons may undermine ‘collective solidarity’. This outcome however is not inevitable and nor does it negate the wider concept of collective professional strategy.

The potential value of this approach has already been demonstrated in studies comparing change across professions. A recent, also drawing on concepts from institutional theory, is Malhotra et al.’s (2006) comparison of change in law and accounting firms. Here it is noted how both professions faced similar pressures to respond to market pressures, driving towards a more business led mode of ‘competitive individualism’ (ibid, 180). Peak associations, however, reacted to these demands differently. Lawyers sought to minimise the impact of change on their practice, while in accounting associations “asserted themselves not just as conservative mechanisms for reproducing existing routines but also playing a role in legitimating new practices” (193). Malhotra et al. (2006) seek to explain these variations in terms of the different structural characteristics of firms, of wider organisational fields and the extent to which professions are embedded in national regulatory contexts. A further example of this approach can be found in Ackroyd et al.’s (2007) comparison of public management reform in three, UK, professional services: health, social care and housing. 

As suggested earlier, one might also apply this notion of ‘strategies’ to the comparative analysis of professions and public management reform at national levels. This however will require: ‘careful interpretation of institutional phenomena and their implications’ (Malhotra et al., 2006: 197). Attention must focus on historical processes of formation of a given profession and in particular on the nature of the ‘regulative bargain’ forged with the state. Such bargains, as hinted earlier, may take on a variety of forms, even in the European context. Added to this one much also consider variations in the demands placed on professions, especially those associated with management restructuring and deregulation. To date however, few attempts have been made in the literature to address these concerns directly. Indeed, very little is known about how professional strategies unfold in different national contexts over time. As such, our goals in the remainder of this paper will be to explore this matter focusing on healthcare reforms in two north European states: the UK and Denmark 

2.	Background and method

The rationale for looking at Denmark and the UK is twofold. First, while there are obviously marked differences in the size and scope of their respective health systems (for more detail see Dent et al., 2007), there are also important similarities in institutions and recent government policies that make comparison meaningful. Crucially both the UK and Denmark represent what Moran (2000: 147) describes as ‘entrenched command and control states’ based on ‘solidaristic’ principles. Each country has developed national healthcare systems, owned and managed by the state, financed from general taxation and where access to care is free (or mainly free) at the point of delivery. As we suggested earlier, in Denmark and the UK, hospital doctors have also been ‘in the main salaried public servants’ (ibid, 143). 

State employment of course did not entirely limit professional freedom or power in either country. On the contrary in both the UK and Denmark one finds historically a high degree of delegation to doctors, not just in the regulation of training and education, but the actual delivery of care. In the latter, up until the early 1980s, a council of consultants elected a chairperson who became the most important, de facto, ‘manager’ in the hospital, although with no authority over clinical staff or budgets. Below this there existed a familiar structure of parallel professional hierarchies with head consultants and nurses at clinic level and smaller numbers of administrative staff in support. This model of running hospitals had been institutionalised during a long period without interference from external forces, and was supported by the Danish medical profession as the ‘natural’ way. 

A very similar pattern of hospital governance emerged in the UK in the 1960s, known as ‘consensus management’. This was a system, ‘built around medical dominance’ (Cox, 1991: 93), in which professions would discuss, deliberate and make decisions. As in Denmark administrators practised ‘diplomacy’ rather than management, forced to mediate between the competing interests of various doctors and specialist groups, whilst trying to match the demand for medical services to the funding available (Klein, 2001). Medical dominance was very much a characteristic of the acute specialists and it enabled them - to paraphrase Kitchener (2000: 132) - to thwart, sidetrack or abort any government initiatives they did not like. While Parliament allocated the funds it was the doctors who decided how most of it was spent.  

It is also pertinent to note that both Denmark and the UK have been at the forefront of public management reforms. In the late 1970s political elites in both countries became increasingly alarmed by rising demand for health care, spiralling expenditure and perceived unaccountable provider power (Klein, 2001; Ejersbo and Greve, 2005). This led national governments to seek to ration services and evoke ‘the private sector as the model to be emulated to remedy these deficiencies’ (Bach and Della Roca, 2000: 86). By a strange coincidence major reforms heralding such change were initiated at more or less the same time: in 1984 in Denmark following the publication of a major hospital commission white paper and 1983, in the UK, with the recommendations of the Griffiths report (see below). 

A further rationale for selecting the UK and Denmark is that such a comparison is also theoretically interesting. Crucial here are differences in institutions and reform processes. There are for example, important differences in the respective organisational structures of state national health systems. Historically the Danish system has been highly decentralised with local authorities (at county and municipal levels) owning, financing and running hospitals (Kragh Jespersen, 2002). By contrast in the NHS the administration and financing of hospitals has been significantly far more centrally controlled - a trend that seems to have accelerated in recent years (Klein, 2001). 

A second key source of difference is in the historical development of the medical profession in Denmark and the UK and in the way NPM reforms were framed and implemented. Later on more will be said about the nature of these conditions and their influence on professional strategies. Before that however it is necessary to comment briefly on our method and data sources

Method
In this paper we draw primarily on a range of secondary data sources from the academic and healthcare policy literatures. Inevitably this means relying on ad hoc studies with varying baselines and research questions. However, such data does allow one to construct a rich picture of the kinds of changes that have occurred and draw conclusions about how the medical professions have, over time, understood and reacted to change. This data were also supplemented with semi- structured interviews conducted as part of an ongoing study focusing on the changing relationship between management and medicine (Kirkpatrick et al., 2007). This has so far involved 30 interviews with senior policy makers, representatives of peak organisations, managers and senior clinicians, including four interviews with senior managers in Denmark. In this paper this data will not be used as a primary source. Rather we have used it mainly to confirm the accuracy of our interpretation of secondary data. 

In what follows we develop a brief narrative of management reforms of hospital care in the UK and Denmark since the 1980s. As well as outlining the key policy changes that were attempted our focus is on how the medical profession in each country responded to these reforms and the extent to which they become involved with and sought to capture management work. The paper then turns to a more general discussion of how one might account for variations. 

3.	Clinical responses to healthcare management in two countries

The United Kingdom

Attempts to strengthen resource management within the NHS date back to the 1960s and were a major feature of a major re-organisation in 1974 (Klein, 2001: 72-73). More radical measures however followed election of the first Thatcher government and a distinctly neo-liberal turn in policy. The Griffiths report of 1983 advocated turning the NHS into a managed organisation in much the same way as any large private corporation. Hospitals were to be managed by general managers with responsibility for a devolved budget. 

One legacy of this change has been a steady increase in the numbers of senior managers employed within the NHS, rising from around 1,000 in 1986 to 20,842 in 1995 (Pollock 2005: 39). This managerial cadre was intended to be a real and direct challenge to medical dominance. Its aim was to pursue reform a role that Harrison (1988) has labelled ‘Manager as the representative of a 3rd party’, in effect an extension of the state with responsibility for implementing government policy. An important element of this role was the ‘promise of tighter measurement and control of clinicians’ work by business managers’ (Pollock, 2005: 107). However, at the same time, it was envisaged that clinicians themselves would apply for these roles and that through initiatives such as ‘resource management’, would take on more of the responsibility for controlling budgets. 

In practice neither of these goals was achieved (at least not in the short term). Peak level medical associations were ‘vigorously, at times almost hysterically, opposed’ to general management (Harrison et al., 1992: 138). Such opposition is neatly encapsulated in a letter written by the BMA to the Secretary of State at that time:

It could be interpreted from the [Griffith’s] report that a somewhat autocratic ‘executive’ manager would be appointed with significant delegated powers, who would - in the interests of ‘good management’ - be able to make major decisions against the advice of the [medical] profession… it should be clearly understood that the profession would neither accept nor cooperate with any such arrangement - particularly where the interests of patients are concerned (cited in Harrison and Ahmad, 2000: 132, emphasis added). 

Perhaps not surprisingly, few if any doctors volunteered to take up general management posts and the majority were filled by old style administrators or managers imported from the private sector (Klein, 2001). At micro level managers were also quite often unable to exercise their authority over doctors, most of whom remained ‘conspicuously autonomous’ (Harrison et al., 1992: 146).

Notwithstanding these setbacks central government pressed ahead with management reform. The political climate of the 1990s saw the continued rise of the neo-liberal critique of public services. This provided the rationale and philosophical basis for the introduction of competition within the NHS through a ‘purchaser provider’ split and the creation of an artificial - or quasi - market (Ranade 1997: 85-87). Hospital and primary care trusts were organised as the service ‘providers’ while District Health Authorities took on their new role as ‘purchasers’ of services (on behalf of the local community/patients). The introduction of the quasi-market strengthened the position of managers, expanding their influence to the negotiation and administration of contracts in the market. A system of GP fund-holding was also piloted, allowing some of the larger practices to become independent purchasers, with their own budget for buying treatment. This represented a further attempt to draw medicine into the management of care. However the innovation that went furthest in this respect was the introduction of clinical directorates (Llewellyn 2001: 597). These were introduced after 1990 and have subsequently become universal across secondary care organisations. So too did the practice of appointing medical directors to sit at board level in a kind of advisory role or a kind of bridge between the interests of managers and senior doctors. 

The response of doctors to these measures has been mixed. Unlike the initial reaction to Griffiths, there was a growing willingness (if not enthusiasm) on the part of the BMA and Royal College of Physicians to accept the principle of clinical directorates (Kitchener, 2000: 138). Within hospitals large numbers of doctors also took on clinical director roles, leading to the emergence of a new generation of hybrid professional managers (see Fitzgerald et al., 2006 for a review). Indeed some research suggests that a minority of doctors have actively engaged with these roles. Llewellyn (2001: 618-19) for example, notes how some clinical directors were keen to get more involved and that this, in turn, helped to ‘enable cost consciousness, performance review, standardisation and evidence based practice’ in UK hospitals. More recently Forbes et al. (2004: 167) identify a growing number of what they term ‘investors’ or doctors who have ‘actively pursued a management opportunity as an alternative to clinical medicine’.

Notwithstanding these developments most doctors did not (and still do not) rush to become clinical directors. As Kitchener (2000: 739) reports ‘In some cases, existing heads of specialities were simply re-labelled as clinical directors’ while ‘in other situations, clinical directors emerged reluctantly’ or were even coerced. Many shared the view of a senior consultant quoted in Parker and Dent (1996: 343), that: 

‘It’s not what [a doctor] wants to do. He doesn’t want to spend his time sitting in committees and sweating over the 600,000 overspend. He wants to get on with the individual patient’. 

More recent studies largely confirm this uneven and lukewarm commitment amongst doctors to serve as managers within hospitals (Hoque et al., 2004; Kirkpatrick et al., 2007). They also point to marked deficiencies in education and training. While there has been some interest in acquiring management skills (see Jacobs, 2005), preparation for this new reality - getting to grips with financial and performance management requirements – has not figured prominently in the education of young doctors (Sinclair, 1997).

Most recently, the ‘New Labour’ Blair regime - post 1997 - has adopted a less confrontational stance towards the medical profession. Nevertheless it too has shown an ongoing insistence for management change and a concern to ensure that medical autonomy does not lead to ‘knavish’ behaviour (Le Grand 2003). One example of this has been the recent negotiations of the new hospital doctors’ contract. Despite being agreed by the BMA’s negotiators this was rejected by the ‘grass roots’ consultants and junior doctors. The ‘new contract offered more money in return … [for] greater managerial control and the potential to be obliged to work unsocial hours’  (Smith 2003: 1047). 

These negotiations have been protracted and fraught with difficulty. What has been hard for the doctors to swallow is the perceived threat to their medical autonomy, as well as undermining their contractual independence to engage in extracurricular activities such as private practice (Davies and Harrison 2003). What the negotiations also reveal is just how little attitudes to management have shifted in the NHS. The sense of ambivalence, even of ‘disconnect’ is palpable. One recent survey of over 1500 managers and consultants reports considerable dissatisfaction with what is perceived to be ‘the single-minded pursuit of financial targets’ within hospitals (Crilly and Le Grand, 2004). Other studies reveal very similar findings (Rundell et al., 2004; Degeling et al., 2006). Indeed, it would appear that, in the UK, management continues to be perceived by a significant majority of doctors as ‘anti-patient, anti-clinical freedom and a threat to…autonomy and values’ (Jacobs 2005: 137). 

This situation may well be changing, with moves to transform medical education and training from a general undergraduate programme - followed by an ‘apprenticeship’ in medicine - to a ‘competency based’ approach that will, in principle at least, be much more closely aligned to the ‘scientific-bureaucratic’ model of evidence-based medicine, care pathways and clinical guidelines (Harrison et al 2002; Clark, 2006). There are also growing calls from professional associations and other peak associations for doctors to become more involved with the governance of their institutions (Royal College of Physicians, 2005). The current situation however is still very much one of widespread disengagement. With some notable exceptions, only a handful of doctors have taken on executive roles on the boards of hospital trusts (Kirkpatrick et al., 2007). Nor, it would seem, is there much enthusiasm or incentive for this amongst the rank and file (Worthington, 2004). To date there has been little sign even of an emergent ‘strategy’ on the part of the UK medical profession to capture or seek to dominate hospital management.


Denmark

Turning to the Danish case, the story could not be more different. Here the first direct effort to interfere with clinical autonomy in hospitals came with the election of a conservative-liberal government in the early 1980s. The overall character of the Danish NPM strategy was a modernization perspective based on tight budget control, rationalization and effectiveness. These goals were originally set out in 1983 and still form the core of the modernization efforts (Ejersbo and Greve, 2005). Gradually the governance structure changed in the direction of a more centralized health care system. Health care policy became an important part of the welfare discussion in most parties, and especially the management of hospitals and longer waiting lists for surgical treatments. In this context, it was believed, the question of appropriate management models in hospitals could no longer be left to the professions alone.

In 1984, a white paper about productivity in hospitals from the Ministry of the Interior recommended that management models should be changed (Indenrigsministeriet, 1984). The idea was to improve productivity by strengthening management and decentralize economic responsibility to clinical leaders. The commission recommended experiments with four different management systems, all with the participation of the medical and nursing profession both at hospital and clinic level. In this way the incorporation of the two important professions in management became part of the official Danish NPM template right from the start.

Also, in stark contrast to the UK clinical professionals did not try to oppose or stifle these moves towards a greater focus on finance, HRM and strategy. Rather, both nurses and doctors sought actively to control or dominate hospital management for their own ends. The nurses wanted to be recognized as a profession on equal terms with doctors in relation to management and the argument was that nurses were better educated in administration and organisation than doctors. They saw the joint management model as a new arena for this ambition. The medical profession, on the other hand, preferred a unitary model at the clinical level with the leading consultant as head of clinics and strongly opposed the joint management of hospitals or clinics. 

In the years after 1984 hospital governance became a central topic for debates between doctors and nurses. At the hospital level there was not much conflict and the troika model quickly became dominating. This system involved a doctor, a nurse and a general manager (usually appointed by local politicians) sharing responsibility for hospital administration. However at clinic (or departmental) level responsibility for management became an area of conflict. The medical profession defended the unitary model as the ‘natural’ approach while reluctantly accepting the troika system. The Danish Medical Association thus stated (Gøtrik, 1988): ‘Considering the kind of tasks that hospitals are expected to handle the leading consultant will be the natural person to perform unitary management. Other groups can have influence on their own work but the view of the Danish Medical Association is that it is needed that the final responsibility for clinical management should be placed at one person’ (Sele, 1994). 

Notwithstanding this medical opposition to nurse involvement, in some parts of Denmark, a joint management system was introduced at clinic level. An early example was the County Council of Funen in 1985. Their model stated that the head nurse and the leading consultant together were responsible for clinic management. However, the Danish Medical Association could not accept this and instructed its members not to apply for management positions in Funen County. The industrial conflict lasted two years and no other county introduced a joint management approach during the conflict. The medical association and the County Council of Funen came to an agreement in 1988 where the doctor in the management team kept responsibility for medical treatment and the nurses’ interests in relation to general and financial management were recognized. After that the joint management model was quickly disseminated to other counties, and by the early 1990s it was widespread in the field. 

During the 1990s centralization of health care policy became more conspicuous and was now accompanied by political critique of the counties for not being effective in the governance of hospitals. This led, by 2002 to a new local government reform commission being set up, and in 2005 to a new local government reform. The former 14 counties are merged into 5 regions, the counties’ rights to impose taxes are abolished and the power of the Ministry of Health is strengthened (Vrangbæk and Christiansen, 2005; Sehested, 2002).

In relation to hospital governance a white paper from the second hospital commission in 1997 (Sundhedsministeriet, 1997) pointed out that quality improvement in hospitals was a main problem and that changed management models could be part of the solution. They suggested a new management concept called ‘unambiguous management’ (the idea was to place all management responsibilities on one person at all levels). The newly implemented joint management systems (discussed earlier) did not, according to the commission, solve the question of accountability and clinical managers were accused of leaving problems unsolved in case of disagreement in the management team (Ministry of Health, 1999). 

The medical association very quickly translated the new concept into unitary management by doctors, even though the Minister of health and the head of the County Councils Association insisted that no group should have a monopoly in relation to management. They also joined in the commissions’ critique of the joint management model (Kragh Jespersen, 2005, Danish Medical Association, 2000). In the years after 1999, the medical association obtained local agreements reviving the unitary medical management in some of the bigger clinics with nurses relegated to vice manager. In many clinical teams it was stated that the doctor had the last say in case of disagreement. In the face of this assault the nurses’ association was rather passive. It did not participate in the local agreements and seemed to take a position where defending the gains they had already made in hospital management became more important than the equal status with doctors. 

What this brief history suggests is a distinctive pathway of management reform in Denmark, one in which clinical professions played a key entrepreneurial role. Unlike the UK, little time was spent debating the fundamentals of management - its compatibility with clinical freedom and ethics. Rather the focus has been on who should control this work – nurses or doctors – and what form such control should take? In Denmark, one might say, professional strategies have focused very much on seeking to capture and dominate hospital management at different levels.
 
Looking at the system today, one obvious manifestation of this strategy is the dominance of clinicians in the higher echelons of hospital administration. Currently doctors sit on the main board of all 30 hospital management teams in Denmark and are Directors in 4 cases. Below this level doctors dominate management within clinics. Unlike the UK very few general managers are employed in the system and play only an advisory or support role in the larger clinics. Professional involvement in management work is also reflected in education and training. In 1999, 41% of the leading consultants in clinical management had a formal management education lasting 1-4 weeks and 34% had more than 4 weeks education (Danish Medical Association, 2000). Among the leading nurses 66% has a formal management education lasting 1 year or more in 2007 (DSR, 2007). More recently the Danish Medical Association has helped to sponsor a new, nationally accredited course in clinical leadership, which has already been attended by 700 out of about 4,000 Danish consultants (Dent et al., 2007). 

Summing up, the new concept of unambiguous management was introduced in order to improve the quality of hospital services and replace the joint management model. However, the new concept had to be interpreted by the central actors in the field, and while the counties had different policies the Danish Medical Association tried (with some success) to reinvent the traditional unitary management. The result of their efforts has been that over the past five years doctors have significantly improved their position in relation to the governance of hospitals and are now clearly the dominant actors in this process. 

4.	Discussion
What these two national case studies reveal are very similar moves to reform healthcare management but markedly different responses from medical professions. In the UK doctors have fought hard (and with some success) to distance themselves from the institutional changes that have engulfed them. Here the scenario has been very much one of ‘oppositional stalemate’ (Degeling et al., 2006). The Danish story however, could not be more different. In Denmark doctors (and nurses) have been centrally concerned not with opposing change but seeking to occupy management roles to shape both practice and priorities from within. 

Such findings of course lead to much broader questions about how one might account for variation. Why is it that in ostensibly very similar health systems undergoing the same kinds of reform professional responses have been so different? To address this matter is beyond the scope of this paper. That said, it is useful to suggest a few avenues for such inquiry drawing on the concepts introduced earlier in this paper. As we noted earlier, the sociology of professions literature suggests that the way in which professional projects unfold in different contexts will have much to do with prevailing institutions and how occupations react to perceived threats and opportunities. Specifically it draws attention to two general factors and conditions that are likely to be important. First is the historical development of professions and health systems in each country and how this may shape current motivations and orientations with regard to management. Secondly, are the way reforms themselves are implemented and the extent to which they generate incentives and either open or close off opportunities for clinical professions to advance their interests. In what remains of this paper we consider both of these issues in more detail.

History and institutions
The importance of historical legacy in shaping professional motivations and objectives is widely noted in the literature. Siegrist (1990: 198), for example, suggests: ‘the history of the professions is to a great extent determined by the degree to which they have been influenced by specific periods’. Focusing on medicine this means giving some consideration to processes of formation and the original ‘blue prints’ for professionalism. Equally important however are subsequent pathways of development and in particular the role played by nation states in the administration and funding of health care. The latter, as we shall see, has either supported or (in the majority of cases) worked against founding professional aspirations and expectations. 

According to Muzio and Ackroyd (2007) ‘the initial self-conception of any occupation will be influenced by the original institutional and ideological context in which occupational development was first formulated. Implied is that conditions of formation may have a lasting legacy on subsequent generations and how they typically perceive their interests. This may be especially true with regard to how clinicians view the organisations of health care and the whole domain of how such organisations are managed. 

Useful for understanding this dimension are comparative studies of the role played by the nation state in professional formation. In some national contexts – what Collins (1990) refers to as the ‘Continental’ mode of professionalism – the state played a key role in driving and guiding the process of occupational development. Here stress is on ‘elite administrators possessing their offices by virtue of academic credentials’ (Collins, 1990: 98). By contrast an Anglo-American mode ‘stresses the freedom of self-employed-practitioners to control work conditions’. In both instances one has the idea of professions as distinct communities, with strategies, in pursuit of social status, prestige and material rewards. A key difference however is in the nature of these rewards – how concepts such as ‘status’ and ‘prestige’ themselves are perceived - and the means used to acquire them. The ‘Continental’ mode suggests a dominant strategy of pursuing status and power within the ambit of the state bureaucracy, focusing on the acquisition of credentials (linked to university education) and achievement of high office. In this context ‘Bureaucracy, academic credentialising, and quasi-aristocratic lifestyle’ are primary collective goals. By contrast, the Anglo American variant sees professional success as result of collective organisation and capture of a market for services. Here ‘the image of an elite profession was not that in the service of the state, nor indeed within any bureaucratic framework modelled after the state. Occupational prestige, rather resided in having one’s own self-regulating organisation’ (ibid, 16). 

These different foundational conditions and original patterns of foundation may tell us much about how professions in the current context respond to management reforms. Where the legacy of the continental mode is strongest, say in France, one might expect professions, relatively speaking, to be more open to the idea of trying to advance collective interests through the colonisation of established organisations of hospital care (Macdonald, 1995). In Denmark one also finds a long tradition of state regulation of health policy and practice, dating back to the Napoleonic era, and a far weaker private sector for health care (Kragh Jespersen, 2005).

By contrast, in the UK, where historically medicine began life as a semi independent, private, ‘liberal profession’, one might expect a different response (Krause, 1996). Here, the original pattern of motivation favoured independence, self-employment and relative detachment from ‘administration’, all aspirations that remain important today. Indeed, this is hinted at by Ackroyd (1996) who notes how, despite the organisational encapsulation of medicine (especially following the creation of the NHS), doctors (and other groups)  ‘do not see themselves as integral to the corporations in which they function’ and are ‘unlikely material for controlling the organisations of which they are part’ (ibid, 605). In the UK, one finds ‘a persistent distinction between professionalism and management that is resistant to erosion’ (ibid, 610). Others have made similar observations. Sinclair (1997) describes how medical socialisation reinforces an ‘exclusive professional identity’, a particular ‘medical habitus’ in which certain kinds of intellectual and cultural capital are valued over and above organisational assets (that might be acquired through management work). 

As well as foundational conditions, one must also focus on subsequent development of health systems and in particular, changes in the relationship between state and medicine. Comparative research suggests that in most health systems professional guild power has lost ground out in terms of autonomy to the state over the past century. According to Krause (1996: 263): ‘The profession that stood completely outside the state in the early 1930s – medicine – has changed its position everywhere, and is now much more closely controlled by the state and indirectly by capitalism…’.  Yet at the same time one should note alternative pathways of such development and variations in the nature of organisational encapsulation of professions across different national systems. Light (1995), for example compares systems along a continuum of professional or state dominance. In the former the medical profession ‘controls not only its own work but also a range of related institutions, services, privileges and finances” (Light, 1995: 30). Invariably, although not necessarily, in these systems professions are ‘independently employed’, with remuneration linked to some kind of ‘fee for service’ model. At the opposite end of the continuum are systems ‘where doctors are employees – with relatively low status and pay – of a delivery system designed by the state’ (Light, 1995: 28).  

These historical pathways of development represent an additional factor that might help understand different professional responses to change. In particular, they suggest that in different national systems there exist variable incentives and opportunities for professions to attempt to become more involved in management. In some contexts, the pattern of change has led to professions retaining (or in the case of Germany, gaining) some independence from state regulation and state employment. This in turn, may mean that doctors have less need to control employing organisations and fewer incentives to engage in management work that might distract them from more lucrative private practice. By contrast, where doctors have limited clinical autonomy and ‘comprehensive salaried status’ (Freddi, 1989) within state health organisations, there may, relatively speaking, be stronger incentives to get involved in management. 

Earlier we argued that in Denmark and the UK doctors have been predominantly state employees ‘accorded a status akin to that of the civil servants’ (Freddi, 1989: 17). This in turn might suggest an equal incentive in both counties for medicine to seek to control and dominate the organisations of healthcare. A more nuanced analysis however reveals important differences in professional incorporation. First, historically doctors in the UK (especially those in the elite) have remained psychologically detached from employing organisations in a way that is far less apparent in Denmark. The establishment of the NHS and subsequent bureaucratisation of medicine may have eroded these sentiments but has done so only incompletely. Secondly, while in both countries the dominant thrust has been towards state monopoly of provision, in the UK this did not fully displace private interests and aspirations. Pollock (2005) notes that in 1998 roughly 16,000 of the 23,000 consultants in the NHS undertook some private practice - a trend that governments appear to have been keen to sponsor (Light, 2000). By contrast, in Denmark, as in other Scandinavian countries (Dent, 2003: 50-53), opportunities for private practice were steadily curtailed over time in order to more firmly wed doctors to the state. 

These subtle differences in the nature and degree of professional incorporation, we suggest, may be important in explaining responses to management. In Denmark received institutions ensure that doctors – whether they like it or not – have little alternative but to pursue their interests through publicly owned and run health organisations. In the UK however, a different mix of incentives are apparent. Here private practice remains a reality for the elite and an important aspiration for everyone else. This in turn seems to have reinforced and perpetuated a ‘fee for service’ mentality and a corresponding sense of detachment from the internal affairs of employing organisations. Quite simply many doctors in the UK have (or at least perceive they have) few incentives to directly engage with management roles and priorities. 

The management reform process
A further set of conditions that are likely to have some bearing on professional strategies are those arising from the nature and process of management reform itself. As we suggested earlier, despite predictions of convergence and notions of a ‘global paradigm’ of NPM reform, there have been important differences in the timing, objectives and approach between nation states (Dent, 2003). These differences are important for understanding the reaction of professions. Specifically, in the context of healthcare, they may influence both the willingness and ability of doctors to engage with or seek to capture the new management agenda. 

According to Pollitt and Boukaert (2000: 48) an important factor likely to influence the progress of the NPM in different national contexts is the ‘sense of “ownership” of reform measures’. This in turn, may have much to do with the objectives of the reform and the extent to which they are perceived as threatening or supporting established interests and values. A distinction might be made here between governments that have sought only ‘modernisation’ and those more interested in far reaching change to create a minimal or ‘night watchman state’. The former ‘still believe in a large role for the state but acknowledge the need for…changes in the way the administrative system is organised’ (ibid, 93). In this context change would seem to pose far less of a threat to established groups than in the latter case where the objective is ‘massive privatisation and wholesale downsizing of public sector organisation’ (ibid, 94). Added to this are particular ‘governing conventions’ of each state and how these also impact on a collective ‘sense of ownership’ (ibid, 47). On this score further distinctions might be made between “consensual regimes” and ‘majoritarian governments’ (ibid, 47). The latter have generally been more willing and able to impose change in a top down fashion, while in the former one finds a greater emphasis on corporatist style bargaining and consultation. Such differences clearly have implications for ownership and engagement. When reforms ‘are seen to have emerged from a broadly based consensus of political opinion, they may assume legitimacy among the public servants who carry them out’ (ibid, 48). By contrast, if reforms ‘are perceived as the doctrinaire instruments of a single party or group, then public servants may resist taking any “ownership”, regarding them as alien impositions which may be delayed or diluted as much as possible’ (ibid, 48). This latter tendency seems especially likely in healthcare organisations where research has consistently found that only ‘collaborative’ or ‘democratic’ forms of leadership have much chance of success (Fitzgerald et al., 2006).

These general observations about change, we suggest, may also be useful for understanding variations in the ‘strategies’ of doctors in Denmark and the UK. In particular they say much about the likely willingness of doctors to co-operate or engage with change. In Denmark this appears to have been higher than the UK given that reforms (cast in terms of modernisation) posed no direct threat to public services or to the institutions of professionalism. In this case, as we saw, the process of negotiating new forms of management in hospitals was highly consultative, with doctors (and other clinical groups) playing a key role in shaping objectives and implementation. A system of negotiation was developed both between the counties and the government and between the professions and the counties (Kragh Jespersen, 2002). This however is in stark contrast to the UK.  Here governments adopted a far more confrontational stance, regarding the professions and their associations are part of the problem rather than part of the solution (Kirkpatrick et al., 2004). From the early 1980s there was also far less willingness to involve professions in the development of new policy. Harrison and Wood, (1999: 757) describe how the NHS review of 1988 (leading to Working for Patients) was ‘conducted informally, largely in secret and uninformed by expert opinion from the field’.

A final point to note here about reform processes concerns the agents selected to drive through policy (Ackroyd et al., 2007). One of the decisive limitations facing any government keen to induce changes in public administration is that of finding a cadre within services willing and able to take over or to develop the executive powers required. One possibility is the model followed in the UK NHS which is to recruit an entirely new group of general managers in possession of generic skills, most notably in the area of finance. The alternative, far easier option as pursued in the Danish case is to persuade professionals themselves to devote more time to management, and for those in charge of institutions (and their support staff) to devote all of their time to these activities. 

These differences have had marked consequences for the level of conflict between professional and management interests, especially where (as in the UK) managers themselves are non-clinicians (Sergeant, 2003). Choices about agents also have implications for the ability of clinical professions to become more engaged in management work and therefore for their strategies. In the UK jurisdictional boundaries between clinicians and managers have been sharply drawn. This is especially post-1983 with the introduction of a new cadre of managers in pursuit of their own professional project. Such competition is likely to have made it harder for doctors to capture management work - even assuming they were willing to do so. Kurunmaki (2004: 328), for example, notes how in Finland, a key reason why doctors have developed accounting expertise is down to the absence of ‘overt inter-professional competition between accountants and medical professionals…’. In stark contrast to the ‘clearly defined jurisdictional encounter in the UK’ accounting knowledge in Finland has historically been an open domain, ‘not regarded as the preserve of a separate and self-defining group’ (ibid, 340). To be sure, one should not overstate this point especially given the limited interest in management amongst UK clinical professions to start with (see above).  It might also be the case that the presence of general managers has provided doctors with a convenient excuse for avoid such responsibility. As Jacobs (2005: 156) argues, in the NHS, unlike other European systems, ‘unit/directorate managers were an important source of technical accounting and management skills and reduced the need for the clinical director to develop their skills in this area…’.  Why spend time on management work when such tasks can easily be delegated to a ‘subordinate occupation’?

Turning to the Danish case, the opposite scenario holds. Here, as we saw, the emphasis was very much on clinicians themselves taking responsibility for driving through change. The new Troika model ensured that clinicians would play a strategic role in management. It also generated inter-professional competition between professions for control over this activity, leading both nurses and doctors to seek to promote their interests by engaging with management at hospital and clinic level. Hence, while restructuring in the UK may have closed off opportunities for clinicians to dominate management work, in Denmark it appears to have had precisely the opposite effect. 

Conclusion
The main objective of this paper has been to question the assumption that health professionals will necessarily respond to management reforms in exactly the same way in all national contexts. While in the UK, the dominant strategy has been one of disengagement, in Denmark clinical professions have more actively sought to colonise management and shape its development. These differences, as we saw, can be linked to particular national traditions and to way restructuring itself either enhanced or closed off opportunities. 

Given these findings a key contribution of the paper is to draw attention to a broader understanding of the factors that will shape NPM reforms in different contexts. In the literature the importance of national institutions, welfare regimes and political traditions has been widely acknowledged. These are understood to lead to path dependent tracks of reform in different countries. But what has been given less attention and what we have sought to illustrate here is the crucial importance of professional collective ‘strategies’ in this process. Depending on the conditions these strategies may be defensive, seeking only to maintain the status quo. They could however be acquisitive, focusing on extending the domain of professional power into new areas. Either way, this approach highlights the need to place the ‘government of medical professionals at the centre of…comparative examinations of provider government’ (Moran, 2000: 143). Doing so allows us to focus on the professions, not as fixed or static constraints on management, but as agents who may shape the nature, timing and outcomes of reform efforts. In short, from this perspective healthcare management restructuring must be understood as a process of co evolution between governments, organisations and clinical professions.  

All this is not to ignore the fact that national variations in clinical responses to public management have been noted elsewhere in the literature. What our paper suggests however is that such differences may be closer to home than previously expected and are apparent even within a narrow sub set of so-called ‘command and control’ health systems (of which Denmark and the UK are prime examples). It also points to a different methodology for understanding these variations. Whereas previous studies have focused on the role of societal culture (Degeling et al., 2006) or education systems (Jacobs, 2005) in shaping attitudes, our approach is begin with the much more inclusive notion of professional strategies. From this perspective comparative analysis should explore two issues. First is to ascertain the nature and purpose of professional ‘strategies’ in relation to management restructuring. Second is to explore the broader institutional and historical context in which these strategies unfold and develop over time. 

Finally, this study points to some useful potential avenues for future research. Most obviously it suggests a need to look at a much wider range of national examples, in particular those of North America and insurance based systems of continental Europe where clinical professions are differently incorporated (Dent, 2003). More generally, our study raises questions about the wider consequences of these different professional strategies. What difference do they make, for example, to the wider quality and performance of health care systems? If doctors spend more time and effort on management work will this add to or detract from the services they provide? Related to this are questions about the consequences for professional power within the system as a whole. One possibility is that the encroachment of management represents only a dilution of professional autonomy and core values, leading to increasing subordination to a new regime of bureaucratic medicine. Against this is the view that by trading ‘accountability’ for ‘autonomy’, doctors might, in the longer term, extend their dominance of healthcare and be able to co-opt management itself. These questions will become increasingly important in future as clinical and managerial domains become increasingly enmeshed and inseparable. 
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